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ERP Use CasesTier 1Published June 21, 2026

Open REST API with OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials for Third-Party Integration

Open REST API with OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials for Third-Party Integration for US and UK finance teams: ERP requirements, controls, audit evidence, data model, APIs, state transitions, and implementation checks.

Platform - Open API / Developer Platform is where ERP discipline either begins or breaks.

Open REST API with OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials for Third-Party Integration looks operational from far away. In a real finance team, it is a chain of assertions: the right actor started the work, the required records existed, the control policy was applied, the state change was preserved, and the outcome can be explained later without rebuilding the transaction from emails and spreadsheets.

The expected business outcome is specific: Third-party integrations connect in ≤1 day using self-serve portal; API SLA 99.9% uptime with p99 response ≤200 ms.

The control flow a finance team actually needs.

Workflow map showing control steps, exceptions, and evidence for this ERP process.OAuth 2.0 Client...Start conditionScopes Are Addit...Required checksClient Secrets S...Owner and SLAToken Introspect...System updateAPI Versioning W...Exception handlingAudit packetEvidence trailException loopPlatform - Open API / Developer Platform should preserve every override and rejection.
Workflow map for this ERP process, including exception handling and audit evidence.

Step 1

OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials And...

Step 2

Scopes Are Additive And Deny-By-Default

Step 3

Client Secrets Stored As Bcrypt Hash

Step 4

Token Introspection Endpoint

Step 5

API Versioning With ≥1 Prior Version...

The ERP surface involved.

Module

Platform - Open API / Developer Platform

Actors

Finance Developer, Third-Party Application, API Gateway

Tier

Tier 1

Finance area

Platform, Integration, Security, Administration & Analytics

Region lens

US and UK finance teams

Publication date

June 21, 2026

OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials (RFC 6749 § 4.4) and Authorization Code + PKCE for user-delegated access; scopes are additive and deny-by-default; client secrets stored as bcrypt hash (never recoverable); token introspection endpoint (RFC 7662); API versioning with ≥1 prior version supported; rate limiting per client (configurable RPM, default 1,000); request and response logging for debug purposes (PII masked); OpenAPI 3.1 spec auto-generated and published; SDK generation from spec for TypeScript, Python, Go; breaking changes announced ≥90 days in advance.

US and UK teams have different compliance hooks, but the same control problem.

US teams usually care about clean evidence for audit support, vendor records, payment controls, tax reporting, and management review. UK teams usually care about VAT-ready records, approval evidence, digital-record discipline, and traceable postings. The country-specific details differ, but the operating pattern is the same: the ERP needs controlled records, explicit ownership, defensible state changes, and evidence that survives beyond the person who completed the task.

The control matrix.

Control areaRequirementAcceptance proof
Control 1OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials (RFC 6749 § 4.4) and Authorization Code + PKCE for user-delegated access
Given a registered API client with invoices:read scope
Control 2scopes are additive and deny-by-default
when the client requests an access token via OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials and calls GET /v1/invoices, then a JWT is issued with scoped claims and the invoices are returned
Control 3client secrets stored as bcrypt hash (never recoverable
when the client exceeds its RPM limit, then 429 with Retry-After header is returned
Control 4token introspection endpoint (RFC 7662negative) when the client requests a scope not granted in org policy, then the token request returns 400 INVALID_SCOPE.
Control 5API versioning with ≥1 prior version supportedThird-party integrations connect in ≤1 day using self-serve portal; API SLA 99.9% uptime with p99 response ≤200 ms.
Control 6rate limiting per client (configurable RPM, default 1,000Third-party integrations connect in ≤1 day using self-serve portal; API SLA 99.9% uptime with p99 response ≤200 ms.

Audit evidence is a chain, not a folder.

Evidence layerWhat should be preserved
Business event
Developer registers an API client in the developer portal, selects scopes (e.g., invoices:read, payments:write), and receives client_id and client_secret. The third-party app requests an access token via OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials grant;
the auth service validates credentials, enforces requested scopes against org policy, and returns a JWT with ≤15-min TTL and scoped claims. The app calls Rivane API endpoints;
the router validates the JWT, checks FGA/OPA for scope + resource authorization, and processes the request. Rate limits are enforced per client. API usage metrics are visible in the developer portal.
Control rulesOAuth 2.0 Client Credentials (RFC 6749 § 4.4) and Authorization Code + PKCE for user-delegated access; scopes are additive and deny-by-default; client secrets stored as bcrypt hash (never recoverable); token introspection endpoint (RFC 7662); API versioning with ≥1 prior version supported; rate limiting per client (configurable RPM, default 1,000); request and response logging for debug purposes (PII masked); OpenAPI 3.1 spec auto-generated and published; SDK generation from spec for TypeScript, Python, Go; breaking changes announced ≥90 days in advance.
Acceptance proof
Given a registered API client with invoices:read scope;
when the client requests an access token via OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials and calls GET /v1/invoices, then a JWT is issued with scoped claims and the invoices are returned;
when the client exceeds its RPM limit, then 429 with Retry-After header is returned;
(negative) when the client requests a scope not granted in org policy, then the token request returns 400 INVALID_SCOPE.
Data record
api_client { client_id: string, org_id: string, name: string, secret_hash: string, scopes: string[], status: enum(ACTIVE,REVOKED), external_id: string };
api_token { jti: string, client_id: string, scopes: string[], issued_at: timestamp, expires_at: timestamp };
rate_limit_counter { client_id: string, window_start: timestamp, request_count: int };
(reference, product may differ).
System event
POST /oauth/token { grant_type: client_credentials, client_id, client_secret, scope } -> 200 { access_token, token_type, expires_in, scope };
POST /oauth/token { grant_type: authorization_code, code, code_verifier } -> 200 { access_token, refresh_token };
POST /v1/api-clients { name, scopes[] } -> 201 { client_id, client_secret };
POST /v1/token/introspect { token } -> 200 { active, scope, exp };
emits api.token_issued and api.rate_limit_exceeded events;
idempotent via external_id.
Lifecycle state
ACTIVE;
terminal REVOKED;
guard: client_secret stored as bcrypt hash (never recoverable);
token TTL ≤15 min;
scopes deny-by-default;
rate limit 429 on RPM breach.

The useful version of this workflow is not only fast. It is inspectable. A controller, auditor, or operator should be able to move from source event to system record to state transition to final business outcome without guessing.

Implementation contracts.

Reference data model

`api_client` { client_id: string, org_id: string, name: string, secret_hash: string, scopes: string[], status: enum(ACTIVE,REVOKED), external_id: string }; `api_token` { jti: string, client_id: string, scopes: string[], issued_at: timestamp, expires_at: timestamp }; `rate_limit_counter` { client_id: string, window_start: timestamp, request_count: int }; (reference, product may differ).

API and events

`POST /oauth/token` { grant_type: client_credentials, client_id, client_secret, scope } -> 200 { access_token, token_type, expires_in, scope }; `POST /oauth/token` { grant_type: authorization_code, code, code_verifier } -> 200 { access_token, refresh_token }; `POST /v1/api-clients` { name, scopes[] } -> 201 { client_id, client_secret }; `POST /v1/token/introspect` { token } -> 200 { active, scope, exp }; emits `api.token_issued` and `api.rate_limit_exceeded` events; idempotent via `external_id`.

State transitions

`ACTIVE`; terminal `REVOKED`; guard: client_secret stored as bcrypt hash (never recoverable); token TTL ≤15 min; scopes deny-by-default; rate limit 429 on RPM breach.

Common implementation traps.

Treating the workflow as data entry

If the ERP only stores the final record, the team loses the decision trail that explains how the record became valid.

Hiding exception logic

Exceptions need owners, reason codes, and time stamps. A vague pending state is not a control.

Posting without recovery design

Retries, duplicate submissions, and partial failures must be explicit so the system does not create inconsistent records.

Skipping evidence design

A workflow that cannot produce evidence on demand will eventually push finance teams back into manual screenshots and spreadsheets.

Where Rivane fits.

Rivane is built for finance workflows where automation must stay tied to source documents, approvals, state transitions, ledger impact, reporting, and audit evidence. Use this guide as a checklist for evaluating whether an ERP workflow is merely digitized or actually controlled.

References and source basis.

These sources provide the standards, regulatory, or government context around the flow. They are included so the guide is useful to finance operators, auditors, and implementation teams, not only buyers reading software copy.

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